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Abstract
Impulsivity, in the sense of the extent rewards are devalued as the time until their realization increases, is linked to vari-
ous negative outcomes in humans, yet understanding of the cognitive mechanisms underlying it is limited. Variation in the 
imprecision of interval timing is a possible contributor to variation in impulsivity. We use a numerical model to generate 
predictions concerning the effect of timing imprecision on impulsivity. We distinguish between fixed imprecision (the 
imprecision that applies even when timing the very shortest time intervals) and proportional imprecision (the rate at which 
imprecision increases as the interval becomes longer). The model predicts that impulsivity should increase with increasing 
fixed imprecision, but decrease with increasing proportional imprecision. We present data from a cohort of European starlings 
(Sturnus vulgaris, n = 28) in which impulsivity had previously been measured through an intertemporal choice paradigm. 
We tested interval timing imprecision in the same individuals using a tri-peak temporal reproduction procedure. We found 
repeatable individual differences in both fixed and proportional imprecision. As predicted, birds with greater proportional 
imprecision in interval timing made fewer impulsive choices, whilst those with greater fixed imprecision tended to make 
more. Contradictory observations in the literature regarding the direction of association between timing imprecision and 
impulsivity might be clarified by distinguishing between fixed and proportional components of imprecision.
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Introduction
The term impulsivity is used in a variety of senses (Evenden 
1999). Here, we use it to mean the extent by which a reward 
is devalued as the time to its realization increases, also 
known as delay discounting. Impulsivity of this kind var-
ies between individuals. In humans, greater impulsivity 
has been linked to psychological conditions ranging from 
behavioural disorders to addiction (Moeller et al. 2001; Ver-
dejo-García et al. 2008; Patros et al. 2016). In non-human 
animals, impulsivity is influenced both by current energetic 
state, and long-term developmental history (Bateson et al. 
2015; Dunn et al. 2019). However, in neither humans nor 
non-human animals do we fully understand the cognitive 
mechanisms that underlie individual differences in impulsiv-
ity. These mechanisms are likely to involve the processing 
of reward magnitude, or the processing of time intervals, 
or both.
The idea that core cognitive processes relating to time 
might be different in more impulsive individuals has 
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generated a substantial literature in humans (see Wittmann 
and Paulus 2008), though there is at present no consensus 
on exactly what feature of time processing drives variation 
in impulsivity. Several recent rat studies have found cor-
relations between impulsivity and the imprecision of tim-
ing in particular. Imprecision is the amount of variation 
(noise) when an individual repeatedly estimates the same 
time interval; it is thus synonymous with the ‘endogenous 
variability’ discussed by Balci et al. (2009). Two correla-
tional studies found that those individuals whose timing was 
more imprecise were also more impulsive (Marshall et al. 
2014; McClure et al. 2014). In these studies, impulsivity was 
measured by repeated choices between smaller sooner and 
larger later rewards, and timing imprecision was measured 
by either repeated reproduction of a fixed interval (McClure 
et al. 2014), or a temporal discrimination task (Marshall 
et al. 2014). In the former case, animals are trained that a 
response is available after a fixed interval (FI). The impreci-
sion of their timing is estimated by the temporal spread of 
their responses about the trained interval. In the latter case, 
animals are trained to discriminate between a short and a 
long duration stimulus, then tested on a series of stimuli 
of intermediate durations. The shape of the logistic func-
tion mapping their probability of responding ‘long’ onto 
the duration of the stimulus provides an estimate of timing 
precision.
A third rat study (Smith et al. 2015) presents three sepa-
rate experiments where impulsivity and timing imprecision 
were measured simultaneously, and then both measured 
again in the same individuals after an intervention phase. 
The intervention phase, which varied in detail across the 
three experiments, consisted of prolonged working on a task 
requiring the animal to make responses at exact points in 
time, such as a differential reinforcement of low rates of 
responding schedule. In all cases, not only had timing impre-
cision decreased relative to baseline when it was measured 
again after the intervention phase; the rats had become less 
impulsive too. Thus, these results suggest that timing impre-
cision and impulsivity are sufficiently closely linked that the 
same interventions that affect one also affect the other.
Whilst these three rat studies suggest empirically that tim-
ing imprecision might be related to impulsivity, they have 
not formally theorized why this relationship should hold. 
Intuitively, timing imprecision and impulsivity seem like 
they should be related. There is a non-linear, convex down-
ward function linking the perceived value of a reward to the 
delay until its realization. An individual with an imprecise 
perception of, say, an 8 s delay will sometimes perceive that 
delay as 7 s, and sometimes as 9 s. Because of the convexity 
of the discount function, the individual will overestimate the 
perceived value of the reward when it perceives the delay 
to be 7 s by a greater amount than it will underestimate the 
perceived value when it perceives the delay to be 9 s. Thus, 
its average valuation of the reward will be greater than if 
its timing were completely precise, even though its average 
estimate of the delay is 8 s. This is an example of Jensen’s 
inequality (Jensen 1906; Denny 2017). The magnitude of the 
over-valuing effect, for any single option, can be predicted 
provided one knows the shape of the discount function and 
the discount rate k (Mazur 2004).
This principle has been used to make the prediction that 
greater timing imprecision should produce less impulsivity 
(McClure et al. 2014). The study in fact found the oppo-
site pattern. However, we argue that the prediction is not 
so straightforward. Impulsivity is typically measured using 
choices between smaller sooner and larger later rewards. 
Imprecision of interval estimation will apply both to the esti-
mation of the short delay to the smaller sooner reward, and 
the long delay to the larger later reward. It is not intuitively 
obvious which of the two options will be more strongly over-
valued because of the imprecision (or indeed, whether the 
overvaluations of the two options will exactly cancel one 
another out).
Saying that one individual’s interval timing is less pre-
cise than that of another individual could mean two differ-
ent things (Fig. 1): (a) the imprecise individual’s variance 




















Fig. 1  Two components of individual differences in timing impreci-
sion. The imprecision in interval timing increases with the interval to 
be timed. The solid and dashed lines show this relationship for two 
hypothetical individuals. Here, one individual (dashed line) is more 
imprecise than another (solid line), in terms of a larger intercept of 
the line describing the magnitude of imprecision for a given interval 
duration (α, fixed imprecision), and also in terms of this line having a 
steeper slope (β, proportional imprecision)
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some constant that is independent of the delay duration; or 
(b) the imprecise individual’s variance in perceived delay 
increases more steeply with increasing delay than is true for 
the precise individual. If we model timing imprecision as a 
linear function of the delay to be estimated, then these two 
forms of imprecision amount to differences in the intercept 
(α on Fig. 1) of the imprecision function (i.e. the variance 
in estimation of even a very short delay), and the slope (β on 
Fig. 1) of the imprecision function. We henceforth refer to 
the intercept of the imprecision function as the fixed impre-
cision, and the slope of the imprecision function as the pro-
portional imprecision. It remains to be determined which 
of the fixed and proportional imprecision ought to affect 
impulsivity, or whether their effects are even in the same 
direction. We could find no analytical framework in which to 
make predictions on this question. We, therefore, developed 
a numerical model. We then tested the model’s predictions 
using data from a cohort of European starlings.
Numerical model: how should timing 
imprecision affect impulsivity?
Our numerical model was written in R (R Core Development 
Team 2018). The code implementing it is available in the 
Zenodo data repository (https ://zenod o.org/recor d/39716 70). 
In the model, individuals discount rewards that arrive after 
a delay t according to the hyperbolic discounting function 
(Mazur and Biondi 2009):
Here, k is a parameter setting the discount rate. We assume 
that when an individual experiences a delay, their timing of 
it will on average be accurate, but with some imprecision. 
Specifically, for individual i, the perceived duration of an 
interval of true duration t is normally distributed as:
Here, i is individual i’s fixed imprecision, and i is their 
proportional imprecision. Scalar expectancy theory states 
that timing imprecision increases with increasing interval 
duration, with constant ratio between the mean estimate of 
the duration and its variance (the scalar variance property; 
Gibbon 1977). Strictly, under scalar variance, fixed impreci-
sion should be zero, whilst proportional imprecision should 
be a positive constant. However, scalar variance does not 
hold exactly: even in the original studies, there was a small 
but positive intercept of the regression line of imprecision on 
FI (Gibbon 1991). This has typically been treated as unim-
portant noise, and individual differences in this fixed compo-






t, i + 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However, it is reasonable to assume that both α and β typi-
cally have positive values and can vary between individuals.
We simulated the scenario where there are two rewards, 
one that arrives after 3 s and one that arrives after 8 s. Indi-
viduals assign a value to each outcome based on the per-
ceived rather than the true delay to reward. Their value for 
the option after experience is the mean of the values of the 
individual instances of it they have experienced. Thus, for 
each option, our model implements Mazur’s (2004) equa-
tion for predicting the value of a reward where there is 
variability in delay. The parameter of interest is the relative 
value assigned to a smaller sooner reward compared to a 
larger later reward (averaged over 100,000 experiences of 
each delay, and normalized relative to the values assigned 
by an individual with perfectly precise timing, i.e.  = 0 
and  = 1 ). Hence, a higher relative value equates to greater 
impulsivity. We explore the effects of varying the individu-
al’s values of α and.
Results are shown in Fig. 2. We use k = 0.54, the aver-
age discount rate estimated from a previous study of Euro-
pean starlings (Bateson et al. 2015). Where the proportional 
imprecision  is small, increasing the fixed imprecision α 
produces greater impulsivity. This is intuitive: if there is a 
constant increment in imprecision that applies to the estima-
tion of both rewards, then its over-valuation impact will be 
greater on the smaller sooner reward, because the discount 
function is steepest at this point (for a graphical illustration, 
see Fig. 2b). Thus, it will produce greater over-valuation of 
that reward and greater impulsivity. However, for any given 
α, increasing the proportional imprecision  reduces impul-
sivity. This is because an excess of proportional impreci-
sion will lead to larger error in the estimation of the delay 
to the larger later reward in particular, producing a greater 
over-valuation of that reward, and hence less impulsivity 
(Fig. 2c). As  becomes larger, the differences in impulsivity 
with increasing α disappear. With 100,000 samples at each 
delay, these results show very little variation from run to run 
of the simulations. We also repeated the simulations with 
both higher and lower discount rates. Results were qualita-
tively similar, though with very low values of k, sensitivity 
to variation in first α then  is abolished. This is because, in 
the limit as k → 0 , the hyperbolic discount function becomes 
a horizontal straight line, and Jensen’s inequality does not 
apply.
The model shows that we cannot make a global predic-
tion concerning the association between timing imprecision 
and impulsivity. Instead, timing imprecision must be decom-
posed into the fixed component (the component of impreci-
sion that is independent of the delay), and the proportional 
component (the rate by which imprecision increases as the 
delay increases). The fixed component of imprecision should 
either be positively associated with impulsivity (greater fixed 
imprecision, more impulsive; as long as the proportional 
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component is relatively small), or that the association should 
be null (if the proportional component is large). The pro-
portional component of imprecision should be negatively 
associated with impulsivity (greater proportional impreci-
sion, less impulsive).
In the remainder of this paper, we test these predictions 
using data from a cohort of European starlings. We meas-
ured interval timing using a tri-peak procedure (Hinton and 
Meck 1997; Paule et al. 1999). Because this involves repro-
duction of three different interval durations, the tri-peak 
procedure allows us to separately estimate the fixed and 
proportional imprecision for each individual. We had a prior 
measurement of impulsivity from the same birds, based on 
an intertemporal choice task (Dunn et al. 2019). The birds, 
which were hand reared, had undergone a manipulation of 
developmental conditions that affected their impulsivity 
(see Dunn et al. 2019 for details). Specifically, individuals 
raised under the combination of limited food supply and 
high begging effort were significantly less impulsive than 
other experimental groups. We thus predicted: (1) that birds 
Fig. 2  a Predicted effect from the numerical model of changes in the 
fixed component of timing imprecision (α) and the proportional com-
ponent of timing imprecision (β) on the relative valuation of a smaller 
sooner reward (SS) after 3 s and a larger later reward after 8 s. Valu-
ations are relative to those of an individual with perfectly precise 
timing. A higher relative valuation would lead to greater impulsivity. 
The discount rate is set at k = 0.54, an empirically derived estimate 
for starlings. b, c Illustrative explanations of the effects predicted by 
the model. b Additional imprecision that has the same magnitude at 
all delays (i.e. in α) has a stronger over-valuing effect on the smaller 
sooner reward than the larger later reward, because the discount func-
tion is steeper at this point. c Additional imprecision whose magni-
tude is proportional to the delay (i.e. in β) has a stronger over-valu-
ing effect on the larger later reward than the smaller sooner reward, 
because the additional imprecision is greater at the longer delay
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with greater fixed imprecision in the timing task would if 
anything make more impulsive choices in the impulsivity 
task; (2) that birds with greater proportional imprecision in 
the timing task would make fewer impulsive choices in the 
impulsivity task; and (3) that the developmental factors that 
affected impulsivity would also affect timing imprecision.
Methods
Ethics
Our study adhered to the ASAB/ABS Guidelines for the 
ethical treatment of animals, was approved by Newcastle 
University Animal Welfare Ethical Review Board committee 
and was conducted under U.K. Home Office project licence 
(number PPL70/8089).
Study animals and developmental manipulation
Subjects were 28 European starlings (15 female, 13 male; 
sexed molecularly; see Nettle et al. 2017) from 8 natal fami-
lies belonging to a cohort of 32 chicks hatched in the wild 
in May 2014 in a nest box population on farms in North-
umberland, UK. Three of the cohort had died prior to the 
present experiment and a further bird failed to complete the 
tri-peak procedure task; impulsivity data had been success-
fully obtained for 27 of the 28 birds.
As nestlings, the birds were subject to a manipulation of 
developmental adversity described in full elsewhere (Nettle 
et al. 2017). Briefly, on post-hatching day 5, quartets of sib-
lings were brought to the lab where they were hand reared. 
On day 6 and continuing until day 15, we simultaneously 
manipulated amount of food (hereafter Amount: Plenty or 
Lean) and the begging effort (Effort: Easy or Hard) expe-
rienced by the nestlings, in a 2 × 2 factorial design. Nest-
lings allocated to the Plenty groups were fed ad libitum to 
satiation at each of nine feeding visits per day, while the 
Lean groups received a proportion of the amount consumed 
by the corresponding Plenty group. Initially, this propor-
tion was set to 70%, but it was dynamically adjusted each 
day so that the weight gain of the Lean birds tracked that 
of the lightest nestlings in a previous study of wild-reared 
nestlings. The total amount fed to the Lean groups over the 
whole manipulation was 72.75% that of the Plenty groups. 
Thus, each Lean group received a smaller amount of food 
over the developmental period than the corresponding Plenty 
group, whilst begging for a similar amount of time each day 
Lean birds were lighter at fledging and later to fledge than 
Plenty birds, and were permanently skeletally smaller than 
the Plenty birds (Nettle et al. 2017). To manipulate begging 
Effort, nestlings in the Hard groups received, in addition 
to the nine feeding visits per day, nine sham feeding visits. 
During the sham visits, nestlings were stimulated to beg for 
2 min (the approximate duration of a feed) without receiv-
ing food. Thus, each Hard group received a similar amount 
of food as the corresponding Lean group, but had to beg 
around twice as much to receive it. Hard birds maintained 
lower body weights than Easy Birds through adulthood, and 
showed evidence of different foraging strategies (Dunn et al. 
2018).
From day 16 onwards, all birds received ad  libitum 
food. Once the fledglings became independent (approx. 
4 weeks post-hatch), they were transferred into mixed-
sex, mixed-treatment groups housed in two indoor aviaries 
(215 × 340 cm and 220 cm high; ca. 18 °C; 40% humidity; 
15:9 h light:dark cycle) and were fed ad libitum on domes-
tic chick crumb (Special Diets Services ‘Poultry Starter 
(HPS)’), supplemented with cat biscuits (Royal Canin Ltd.), 
dried insect food (Orlux insect pâté), live mealworms and 
fruit.
Experimental cages
For both the timing and impulsivity experiments, birds 
were transferred to individual cages that served both as 
home cages and operant testing chambers. Cages meas-
ured 100 × 45 cm and 45 cm high and were fitted with two 
wooden perches and two water bottles. Each cage contained 
an operant panel of three illuminable pecking keys and a 
feeder trough connected to a pellet dispenser delivering 
45-mg grain-based rodent pellets (TestDiet, Richmond, 
IN, USA), as described in Feenders and Bateson (2013). 
The panels were controlled remotely using the Whisker 
Experimental Control system (Cardinal and Aitken 2010), 
and cognitive tasks were programmed in Microsoft Visual 
Basic 5.0 (Microsoft Corporation, Redmond, WA, U.S.A). 
Temperature and lighting conditions were the same in the 
experimental room as in the aviary. There were eight cages 
in the experimental room, with acoustic and visual contact 
between them. Due to the number of cages available, the 
birds were run in sequential groups of 6–8 birds for both the 
impulsivity and timing tasks.
Impulsivity task
Data on impulsive choice have been reported fully else-
where (Dunn et al. 2019). Impulsive choice testing began 
when birds were aged 978–1044 days. Briefly, birds made 
repeated simultaneous choices between a smaller sooner and 
a larger later food reward, using the same operant apparatus 
as above. At the start of each trial, the central pecking key 
was illuminated with amber light, and a single peck to this 
key was required to initiate the trial, whereby the amber light 
extinguished and either a forced or choice trial began. In a 
forced short-delay trial, pecking a side key illuminated in 
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red produced one 45 mg pellet after a 3 s delay. In a forced 
long-delay trial, pecking a side key illuminated in green 
produced two pellets after an 8 s delay. Choice trials were 
identical to forced trials with the exception that following the 
initiation peck, both side keys were illuminated (one in red 
and one in green). A single peck indicated the bird’s choice. 
Birds completed 120 trials (or a maximum of 4 h) per day, 
7 days a week and all completed 10 days of the impulsivity 
task. We used the proportion of completed choice trials on 
which the bird chose the smaller sooner key as the measure 
of impulsivity using data for each bird from day 5 to day 10 
of the task inclusive.
Timing imprecision: tri‑peak procedure temporal 
reproduction task
The tri-peak procedure task began when birds were 
1308–1658 days old. Habituation and operant training pro-
cedures followed those described by Dunn et al. (2019). To 
progress on to the tri-peak procedure task, birds had to peck 
on at least 80% of initial training trials involving one lit key 
for three consecutive sessions, or at least 50% of trials for 
five consecutive sessions. Trials took place between 0730 
and 1230, with ad libitum food (10 g dry cat biscuits, 5 g 
chick crumb, 5 g dried insect food, a slice of fruit and 4 live 
mealworms) and water baths provided from 1230 until 1630.
Birds were trained on three fixed-interval (FI) reinforce-
ment schedule durations (5 s, 15 s and 45 s) associated with 
three separate pecking keys. Since we were primarily inter-
ested in individual differences and hence required all birds to 
have the same experience, all birds received the same assign-
ment of key positions to intervals, namely: left key to 5 s, 
central key to 15 s and right key to 45 s. At the start of each 
trial, the central pecking key was illuminated with amber 
light. This remained illuminated until the bird initiated a 
trial by a single peck to this key, whereby the amber light 
extinguished and all three pecking keys were illuminated in 
green. On SHORT trials, a single peck to the left key after 
an interval of 5 s or greater caused all keys to extinguish and 
initiated the illumination of the hopper light and delivery of 
one reward pellet. On MEDIUM trials, a single peck to the 
central key after an interval of 15 s or greater was rewarded 
with a pellet. On LONG trials, a peck to the right key after 
an interval of 45 s or greater was rewarded with a pellet. 
There were no consequences of responses on incorrect keys, 
or early responses on the correct key. An inter-trial interval 
(ITI) of 100 s began following pellet delivery. Each daily 
session comprised 2 blocks (beginning 07:30 and 10:10), 
each with a maximum of 30 trials and ending after 2.5 h if a 
bird had not completed. Within each block, an equal number 
of SHORT, MEDIUM and LONG trials were presented in 
random order.
Once a bird completed at least 80% of trials each day for 
5 consecutive days, the 30 SHORT, MEDIUM and LONG 
trials of each block were randomly interspersed with 10 
PROBE trials. In PROBE trials, all keys remained illumi-
nated for 135 s and then extinguished, with no consequences 
for pecks on any key, and no reward given. We recorded the 
number of peck responses on all keys throughout all trials 
in 0.5 s time bins from the initiation of each trial. Birds 
were tested 7 days a week and completed between 873 and 
2026 trials in total, the procedure ending when all birds in 
each group had completed at least 9 days with PROBE tri-
als (range 9–22 days). This large number of trials provided 
birds with opportunity to learn the FI durations and develop 
stable responses. We analysed only data from PROBE trials 
on the final 4 days of the task (i.e. a maximum of 60 PROBE 
trials per bird).
Statistical analysis
The raw data and R script are archived in the Zenodo reposi-
tory (https ://doi.org/10.5281/zenod o.39716 70). Statisti-
cal analyses were conducted in R v3.5.1 (“R Development 
Core Team” 2011) using the base statistical procedures and 
‘lme4’ packages (Bates et al. 2015).
Under FI schedules, animals tend to begin responding at a 
low rate and increase response frequency as the criterion FI 
approaches. In PROBE trials, where no reward is delivered, 
response frequencies taper off once the FI has passed. Thus, 
we described birds’ timing functions for each of the three 
FIs using three parameters (Hinton and Meck 1997): (1) 
Peak Rate—the maximal rate of pecking on the target key, a 
measure of motivation; (2) Peak time (hereafter Peak)—the 
time of the maximal rate of pecking, a measure of the bird’s 
central estimate of the FI; and (3) Spread—which we here 
define as the duration between the lower bound and upper 
bound time at which the peck rate was half the Peak Rate. 
This is a measure of timing imprecision, with a larger Spread 
indicating greater imprecision (Church et al. 1994).
There are two approaches to estimating Peak Rate, 
Peak and Spread (Church et al. 1994). The mean-response 
approach first averages responses across trials, and then esti-
mates the target parameters for each animal from those aver-
age response patterns. The single-trials approach estimates 
Peak Rate, Peak and Spread from each trial, and only then 
averages those estimates to give a value for each animal. 
Using the data from the first 14 birds to be run, we experi-
mented with the single-trials approach. This assumes that 
each trial can be characterized by an initial period at one 
rate of responding, a discrete step up to a higher rate as the 
FI approaches, and a discrete step down again to a lower 
rate after the FI has passed. The temporal positions of the 
steps up and down for each trial are estimated numerically 
from the pattern of responses. However, if responses occur 
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in bursts, the two-step model fits poorly and/or produces 
step-points that fail to include most responses within the 
high-rate period. For this reason, researchers using the sin-
gle-trials approach exclude some trials, using various fit cri-
teria (Church et al. 1994; Matell et al. 2006). In the present 
case, responses often occurred in bursts, especially in the 
longest FI, as birds returned briefly to their perches during 
the trials. Thus, applying the single-trials approach resulted 
in the exclusion of a high proportion of trials, whichever fit 
criteria we applied.
Instead, we used the mean-response approach. For each 
bird, we calculated the mean number of responses on each 
key within each 0.5-s time bin across all PROBE trials dur-
ing the final 4 days of the task. Next, we fitted polynomial 
functions to these data for each bird. Using data from the 
first 14 birds, we systematically increased the order of the 
polynomial functions used, from two upwards. The proxim-
ity of the Peak estimated from the polynomial function to 
the numerical maximum of the data (and to the duration 
of the trained FI) continued to improve as the order of the 
polynomial increased, particularly for the shortest FI, but 
with little further gain above order 10. We thus used 10th-
order polynomials for all subsequent estimation. From the 
fitted polynomials, we defined the Peak as the time of the 
maximum fitted value. Peak Rate was defined as the rate of 
pecking corresponding to the Peak. We then defined as the 
lower and upper bounds the time at which peck rate equaled 
half the Peak Rate, and calculated the Spread as defined 
above. Having obtained, for each bird, a Spread value for 
each of the FIs, we fitted a linear model with the FI duration 
as the predictor variable and the Spread as the outcome. The 
intercept from this model was our estimate of that bird’s 
fixed imprecision, and the slope was our estimate of the 
bird’s proportional imprecision.
For the main analyses, we used general linear mixed mod-
els incorporating random intercepts for natal family, and 
individual bird where we had repeated measures. The fixed 
effects included in each model are described in the relevant 
Results section and in Table 2. We included sex as a control 
variable in all analyses of timing performance measures to 
allow for the detection of sex-specific effects, because sex 
differences in interval timing occur in rats (McClure et al. 
2014); results without controlling for sex are extremely simi-
lar. For models including the developmental treatments, we 
initially included interaction terms (e.g. Amount*Effort) and 
sequentially removed non-significant interactions to produce 
the final models reported in Table 2. Measures of Peak and 
Spread were, where appropriate, normalised across FI dura-
tions prior to analysis by standardizing them to the mean and 
standard deviation of that FI. Fixed and proportional impre-
cision were standardized for analysis but not for plotting. 
Maximum-likelihood estimation was employed throughout. 
Significance testing for mixed models used Satterthwaite’s 
method in R package ‘lmerTest’. We assumed a criterion for 
significance of p < 0.05.
To examine individual consistency in timing performance 
measures, we separately fitted polynomials on data from 
PROBE trials on the final two days of the tri-peak proce-
dure and the 2 days prior to this, and conducted a variance 
components analysis to ascertain the proportion of variance 




Key pecking responses on each key were distributed across 
time with a single peak, as expected (Fig. 3). On average, 
birds showed accurate timing, with mean Peak values fall-
ing close to the trained FIs (mean ± SE, SHORT (5 s FI) 
4.77 ± 0.18 s; MEDIUM (15 s FI) 14.21 ± 0.60 s; LONG 
(45 s FI) 41.38 ± 1.72 s; Fig. 3). Birds switched their high-
est response rates from key to key at the geometric means 
of the two trained FIs: left to centre, geometric mean 8.66 s, 
observed 9  s; centre to right: geometric mean 25.98  s, 
observed 26.5 s. As expected, average Spread increased with 
FI for all birds (mean ± SE, SHORT (5 s FI) 10.27 ± 0.36 s; 
MEDIUM (15  s FI) 25.34 ± 1.58  s; LONG (45  s FI) 
66.45 ± 4.82 s; see Fig. 4 for data from each bird). How-
ever, the birds’ performance did not show the scalar variance 
property. The scalar variance property implies a constant 
coefficient of variation across FIs (i.e. the Spread divided 
by the FI should be constant across SHORT, MEDIUM and 
LONG keys). In fact, Spread/FI was significantly higher for 
SHORT (mean ± SE 2.05 ± 0.07) than MEDIUM (mean ± SE 
1.69 ± 0.11) or LONG (mean ± SE 1.48 ± 0.11; linear mixed 
model: βMEDIUM = −0.22, SE 0.06, t = − 3.65, p < 0.001; 
βLONG = − 0.38, SE 0.06, t = − 6.43, p < 0.001; figure S1). 
This implies the existence of fixed as well as proportional 
imprecision in the birds’ timing performance. Indeed, birds 
displayed non-zero fixed imprecision overall (mean ± SE: 
3.76 ± 1.18 s, t test against μ = 0, t = 3.19, p = 0.004) as well 
as non-zero proportional imprecision overall (mean ± SE: 
1.40 ± 0.12 s, t test against μ = 0, t = 11.28, p < 0.001).
Seven birds had fixed imprecision values of less than 
zero. Negative imprecision is impossible, and thus this indi-
cates imperfect estimation of the underlying parameter of 
interest. On the principle of minimising data manipulation, 
we not only retained the negative values, but also calculated 
a truncated version of the variable where negative values 
were set to zero. We repeated the analyses with the truncated 
version, and report these briefly below where relevant.
Birds with greater fixed imprecision showed lower 
proportional imprecision (r = − 0.79, p < 0.001; this 
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correlation was slightly attenuated using the truncated 
fixed imprecision variable, r = − 0.62, p < 0.001). We 
also calculated the correlations of fixed and propor-
tional imprecision to the Spreads at each of the three FIs 
(Table 1). Fixed imprecision was unrelated to the Spread 
at 5 s, significantly positively related to the Spread at 15 s, 
and significantly negatively related to the Spread at 45 s. 
Proportional imprecision was almost perfectly correlated 
with the Spread at 45 s. Thus, the hallmark of a bird with 
high proportional imprecision is that they are more impre-
cise at the longest delay.
Timing imprecision and impulsivity
To examine the relationship between choice impulsivity and 
interval timing precision, we ran two models with proportion 
of choices for the smaller sooner reward as the outcome vari-
able, and fixed or proportional imprecision as the predictor 
Fig. 3  a Overall tri-peak temporal reproduction procedure perfor-
mance averaged across all birds. b, c Plots from two individual birds 
with differing interval timing performance. Fitted polynomial shown 
(solid line). The individual (BGPP) in panel b shows greater impre-
cision (Spread) as compared to the individual (BGYY) in panel c. 
Data show the mean number of responses on each key in 0.5 s time 
bins during PROBE trials during the final 4 days of the task. Verti-
cal dashed reference lines show the FI durations on which birds were 
trained. Vertical solid grey lines indicate the geometric means of the 
first and second FI durations, and the second and third FI durations. 
Data for the remaining 25 birds are shown in Supporting Information, 
figure S2
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variables (Table 2, models 1 and 2). The high degree of 
collinearity between fixed and proportional imprecision 
prevented them being entered simultaneously into the same 
model (see “Discussion”). The association between fixed 
imprecision and impulsivity was non-significantly positive 
(Table 2, model 1; Fig. 5a; using the truncated version of this 
variable instead produced the same conclusion and a slightly 
smaller but still positive parameter estimate). Proportional 
Fig. 4  Spread of responses 
against fixed interval duration, 
by bird. Data are from the final 
4 days of the tri-peak temporal 
reproduction task. Individual 
starlings are identified by a 
4-letter code. Solid lines rep-
resent linear fits for each bird. 
Dotted lines represent expecta-
tion under the assumption of 
scalar variance, with the ratio 
of Spread to FI delay given by 
the grand mean across birds and 
delays
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imprecision significantly predicted choice impulsivity, nega-
tively, with more imprecise birds making fewer choices for 
the smaller sooner reward (Table 1, model 2; Fig. 5b).
Effects of developmental experience, individual 
identity, natal family and sex on timing 
performance
We modelled birds’ fixed imprecision and proportional 
imprecision as outcome variables, with the developmental 
treatments Amount and Effort, as well as their interaction, 
as fixed predictors (Table 2 models 3 and 4). Develop-
mental treatments did not significantly predict either fixed 
imprecision (Fig. 6a) or proportional imprecision (Fig. 6b). 
Conclusions were unchanged using the truncated version of 
the fixed imprecision variable instead. However, it is note-
worthy that the experimental group that was significantly 
less impulsive than the others (Lean–Hard) also had the 
highest average proportional imprecision values (Fig. 6b).
We also carried out exploratory analyses of whether 
developmental treatments predicted birds’ Peak, Peak Rate 
or Spread for each key (Table 2 models 5–7). Amount sig-
nificantly predicted Spread (Table 2, model 5). Across keys, 
birds raised on a Lean diet had larger Spreads than those 
raised with Plenty to eat as nestlings (estimated marginal 
means ± SE: Lean 0.28 ± 0.20, Plenty − 0.27 ± 0.20). Effort 
significantly predicted Peak across keys (Table 2 model 6). 
Birds that experienced Hard begging effort as nestlings had 
earlier Peaks than those that had experienced Easy begging 
effort (estimated marginal means ± SE: Hard − 0.26 ± 0.15, 
Easy 0.29 ± 0.16). Effort also significantly predicted Peak 
Rate (Table 2 model 7). Birds that experienced Easy begging 
effort as nestlings had a higher Peak Rate than those that 
had experienced Hard begging effort (estimated marginal 
means ± SE: Hard 0.51 ± 0.06, Easy 0.70 ± 0.06). There was 
also a significant effect of key: birds showed higher Peak 
Rate on the left key than the other two keys (Table 2 model 
Table 1  Correlations (r) between fixed and proportional imprecision 
values, and the spread of the fitted polynomial at each of the three FI 
delays
Results are qualitatively similar using the truncated version of the 
fixed imprecision variable
*p < 0.05
Spread 5 s Spread 15 s Spread 45 s
Fixed imprecision α − 0.01 0.41* − 0.71*
Proportional imprecision β 0.35 0.22 0.99*
Table 2  Output of mixed models. SS: smaller sooner
Model Response variable Fixed predictor variables Random effects B (SE) t p value n
Choice impulsivity
 1 Proportion SS choices Fixed imprecision Natal family 0.06 (0.03) 1.81 0.083 27
Sex: M 0.05 (0.06) 0.78 0.443
 2 Proportion SS choices Proportional imprecision Natal family − 0.10 (0.03) − 3.62 0.001
Sex: M 0.05 (0.05) 1.03 0.313
Interval timing precision
 3 Fixed imprecision Amount: Lean Natal family − 0.16 (0.39) − 0.40 0.692 28
Effort: Hard − 0.41 (0.39) − 1.06 0.300
Sex: M − 0.72 (0.43) − 1.67 0.106
 4 Proportional imprecision Amount: Lean Natal family 0.65 (0.38) 1.72 0.101 28
Effort: Hard 0.45 (0.38) 1.19 0.247
Sex: M 0.06 (0.42) 0.14 0.887
Exploratory models
 5 Spread (standardised by key) Amount: Lean Natal family/Bird 0.55 (0.23) 2.33 0.030 84
Effort: Hard 0.18 (0.24) 0.76 0.457
Sex: M − 0.45 (0.27) − 1.66 0.110
 6 Peak (standardised by key) Amount: Lean Natal family/Bird 0.05 (0.24) 0.21 0.832 84
Effort: Hard − 0.55 (0.24) − 2.32 0.023
Sex: M
 7 Peak rate Amount: Lean Natal family/Bird − 0.04 (0.16) − 0.46 0.646 84
Effort: Hard − 0.19 (0.09) − 2.22 0.035
Sex: M − 0.01 (0.09) − 0.01 0.927
Key: Centre − 0.19 (0.05) − 3.64  < 0.001
Key: Right − 0.17 (0.05) − 3.64  < 0.001
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7; estimated marginal means ± SE: Left key 0.72 ± 0.05, 
Centre key 0.53 ± 0.05, Right key 0.55 ± 0.05). We found 
no significant effect of sex on any of the measures of timing 
performance (Table 2 models 3–7).
There was evidence of individual consistency. When 
the data from the final 4 days of PROBE trials were split 
into the penultimate two and last 2 days, individual identity 
accounted for 60% of the variance in fixed imprecision and 
71% in proportional imprecision. In contrast, the variance 
accounted for by natal family was estimated at zero for both 
fixed and proportional imprecision.
Discussion
Our starting point was recent rat findings showing that 
greater timing imprecision is associated with greater 
impulsivity (Marshall et al. 2014; McClure et al. 2014; 
Smith et al. 2015). We first sought, through a numerical 
model, to establish why this should be the case. Our model 
highlighted the importance of distinguishing between 
fixed imprecision (the constant amount of imprecision 
that applies independently of the delay to be timed) and 
Fig. 5  a Relationship between fixed imprecision in timing and the 
proportion of choices for the smaller sooner reward (SS) in the impul-
sivity task. b Relationship between proportional imprecision in tim-
ing and the proportion of choices for the smaller sooner reward (SS) 
in the impulsivity task. Lines represent linear fits, and shaded areas 
95% confidence intervals
Fig. 6  Effects of developmental treatments on timing imprecision. a Fixed imprecision. b Proportional imprecision. Developmental treatments 
are Effort: H is Hard, E is Easy; Amount: L is Lean, P is Plenty. Shown are means ± one standard error
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proportional imprecision (the amount by which impreci-
sion increases as the delay to be timed increases). The 
model predicted that greater imprecision should increase 
impulsivity only for fixed imprecision; for proportional 
imprecision, greater imprecision should in fact reduce 
impulsivity. We then measured timing imprecision in a 
cohort of European starlings whose impulsivity had been 
previously measured. We found, qualitatively supporting 
the predictions of the model, that greater fixed impreci-
sion tended to associate with greater impulsivity, whilst 
greater proportional imprecision was associated with less 
impulsivity.
The reasons that the effects of the two types of impreci-
sion are predicted by the model to be in opposite directions 
are as follows. Increasing the fixed imprecision means add-
ing a fixed amount of noise to the perception of the duration 
of both delays. As this is the same amount of extra noise for 
both, it has a proportionately greater over-valuing effect on 
the smaller sooner reward, since the discount function is 
steeper at shorter delays, and hence the impact of any given 
amount of over- or under-perception is larger. On the other 
hand, increasing the proportional imprecision means add-
ing an amount of noise to the perception of the delay that is 
much larger for the longer duration. This larger increment of 
extra noise overwhelms the fact that the discount function is 
flatter in the vicinity of the long delay, and hence produces 
a greater over-valuing effect on the larger later reward rela-
tive to the smaller sooner. In short, the marginal impact of 
increased imprecision on the relative valuation of a smaller 
sooner and a larger later reward depends entirely on how that 
imprecision is added: as a fixed constant regardless of delay, 
or as a scaling factor proportional to the delay.
In our starling study, we separated out, for the first time, 
the fixed and proportional components of timing impreci-
sion. We were able to do this because the tri-peak temporal 
reproduction task provides estimates of imprecision for the 
same individual for three different intervals, allowing us to 
extract an intercept and a slope for the relationship of impre-
cision to the fixed interval, and hence separately characterise 
fixed and proportional imprecision. An important conclusion 
from our data is that starling timing does not show the scalar 
variance property. The fact that imprecision increases for 
long intervals is often taken as an informal test of scalar 
variance (Lejeune and Wearden 2006; Wearden and Lejeune 
2008). Strict scalar variance is a stronger claim though: the 
ratio of the imprecision to the FI must be constant across 
FIs, or, equivalently, a regression line of imprecision on FI 
should pass through the origin. We found this was not so: in 
our starlings, the ratio of the imprecision to the FI decreased 
with increasing FI, and the regression line of imprecision 
on FI had a positive intercept. The conclusions from this 
starling study about how impulsivity relates to timing impre-
cision depend very much on which of the two imprecision 
measures one uses: greater imprecision tends to be associ-
ated with greater impulsivity if you use the fixed (intercept, 
α) measure, but it is associated with less impulsivity if you 
use the proportional (slope,  ) measure. Thus, our starling 
findings conform to both the assumptions and the predictions 
of the numerical model.
Are our starling findings consistent with those from 
the three rat studies (Marshall et al. 2014; McClure et al. 
2014; Smith et al. 2015)? They are in the same direction, 
albeit non-significantly in our case, if we use our fixed 
timing imprecision measure, but they appear to be in the 
contrary direction if we use our proportional timing impre-
cision measure. None of the three previous rat studies sepa-
rately reports timing imprecision at different durations, nor 
attempts to distinguish the fixed and proportional compo-
nents of imprecision. The clear guidance to the field, then, is 
to consider carefully whether the measure of timing impre-
cision being used reflects predominantly fixed imprecision, 
in which case we might predict a positive association with 
impulsivity; proportional imprecision, in which case we 
might predict a negative association; or some mixture of 
the two, in which case predictions are hard to make. We 
suggest that imprecision measures taken at very short dura-
tions are likely to reflect mostly fixed imprecision, whereas 
those taken at longer durations are likely to reflect mostly 
proportional imprecision. In our starling data, the impre-
cision measured by the Spread of the best-fitting polyno-
mial at the longest FI (45 s) was near-perfectly positively 
correlated with the proportional imprecision; whereas the 
fixed imprecision was significantly positively correlated 
with the Spread at 15 s. Thus, whether a single measure of 
imprecision mainly reflects fixed or proportional impreci-
sion depends how short or long a duration it is measured at. 
What constitutes a ‘short’ or a ‘long’ duration will depend 
on the discount rate of the species in question. The study 
by McClure et al. (2014), for example, measured impreci-
sion at 11 s, which is closer to our medium delay. How-
ever, rats have lower discount rates than starlings (Bateson 
et al. 2015). Thus, our results are consistent with the results 
of that study, if we assume that the imprecision measure 
used by McClure et al. in the rats primarily reflected fixed 
imprecision.
We found that starlings readily learned the distinct FIs 
associated with each key in the tri-peak procedure task, and 
were fairly accurate over all in their timing, as indicated 
by the locations of the peak rates of responding. The point 
at which the highest rate of responding switched from key 
to key was very close to the geometric mean of the two FI 
durations. This matches previous findings with temporal 
bisection tasks (Platt and Davis 1983). One interpretation 
of the fact that switching occurs at the geometric rather than 
arithmetic mean is that birds perform optimal temporal risk 
assessment (Balci et al. 2009, 2011). That is, they take into 
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account the greater endogenous uncertainty associated with 
the long delay, and hence switch responding not half way 
between the two FI durations, but rather at the point where 
the probability of either FI timing out given their respec-
tive uncertainties favours the longer interval (this is at the 
geometric mean, see Bateson and Kacelnik 1995). There is 
other, longstanding evidence that starlings take their own 
timing imprecision into account in making foraging deci-
sions. For example, in deciding when to give up a forag-
ing patch, starlings wait longer after the time at which they 
expect a food reward for patches where they have experi-
enced longer inter-reward intervals (Brunner et al. 1992).
In addition to testing the predictions of our model con-
cerning the relationship of timing precision to impulsivity, 
our empirical study provided detailed data on individual 
variation in timing in the starling. Birds learned the tri-peak 
procedure readily, and their responses conformed to the 
expectations of the paradigm. That is, the peck rate on each 
key on the PROBE trials showed a single peak close to the 
trained fixed interval, with a rapid rise before and a slightly 
slower decline after the interval had passed. By separating 
each individual’s data into two halves (the final 2 days and 
the 2 days prior to this), we were able to show that individu-
als were somewhat consistent in both their fixed and propor-
tional imprecision, suggesting that these are stable individ-
ual differences. We did not detect any natal-family effects. 
This result is somewhat surprising given the occurrence of 
genetic polymorphisms implicated in temporal perception 
in humans and between-strain differences in rats (Marinho 
et al. 2018), although we note our relatively small sample 
of starlings and especially of natal families (eight families 
were represented). Our birds also all originated from a single 
population.
We did not find support for our prediction that the same 
developmental factors that we have shown to affect impul-
sivity in these birds (namely, Hard begging effort and Lean 
amount) should also affect timing imprecision. This would 
follow logically from the claim that a substantial driver of 
variation in impulsivity is variation in timing imprecision. 
However, the developmental effects on fixed and propor-
tional imprecision were not significant. Our other explora-
tory results concerning developmental experience relate to 
some of our previous findings with this cohort of birds. In 
the present study, we found that birds which were made 
to beg harder as nestlings (the Hard treatment) had earlier 
Peaks, but lower Peak Rates. This is somewhat paradoxical 
in light of previous findings. Increasing reward value in 
peak procedure tasks both shifts peak responding earlier, 
and increases response rates (Galtress and Kirkpatrick 
2009). Thus, if the Hard birds valued food rewards more 
highly, we might expect both earlier Peaks and higher 
Peak Rates. We have found similarly paradoxical results 
on these same birds in other behavioural paradigms. The 
Hard birds better defend their rate of energy intake when 
foraging is effortful (Neville et al. 2017; Dunn et al. 2018). 
On the other hand, they also maintain lower body weights, 
presumably by eating less overall. Here, it seems that their 
lower Peak Rate, which suggests lower food motivation, 
patterns with their lower bodyweights; whilst their earlier 
Peaks pattern with their defence of their rate of energy 
intake. We also found that birds that experienced restricted 
early food supply (the Lean treatment) had poorer pre-
cision as measured by the Spreads across the individual 
keys. This would suggest the importance of early nutrition 
in the development of precise timing.
One limitation of our study was that the choice impul-
sivity task consisted of one smaller sooner to larger later 
comparison, whereas previous studies have included 
multiple smaller sooner delay conditions (Marshall et al. 
2014). However, the associations with timing in the study 
by Marshall et al. (2014) were with preference for smaller 
sooner averaged across the different smaller sooner delays, 
Moreover, individuals were highly consistent in their pref-
erence across different delays, suggesting that any single 
delay would be adequate for these purposes. Another limi-
tation of our study is that fixed and proportional impreci-
sion were highly (negatively) collinear. This prevented us 
entering both terms in the same model to predict impul-
sivity, which, if possible, would have been preferable as a 
test of the numerical model. It is possible that this negative 
dependence is a genuine biological relationship. However, 
we note that it could be at least partly an artefact of meas-
urement error. With imprecision estimated from just three 
FIs, there is a substantial amount of measurement error 
on the slope of the regression of imprecision on FI (i.e. 
the proportional imprecision). Any measurement error that 
causes this slope to be measured as steeper than it really 
is, is also likely to lead to an estimate of the intercept as 
lower than it really is. Any measurement error that causes 
the slope to be measured as flatter than it really is will 
tend to lead to an estimated intercept that is larger than it 
should be. Thus, the strong negative dependence of fixed 
and proportional imprecision, which almost guarantees 
that their respective effects on impulsivity will be in con-
trary directions (as predicted by the numerical model), 
could in part be a consequence of coupling due to shared 
measurement error. Future investigations should measure 
fixed and proportional imprecision at a greater number of 
distinct FIs to mitigate this issue.
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